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"They	started	to	fight	when	the	money	got	tight,	and	they	just	didn't	count	on	the	tears	..."		
	
																																																																										Billy	Joel	"Scenes	from	an	Italian	Restaurant"	
	
I. Introduction	
Do	recessions	tear	married	couples	apart?	Or	do	they	push	them	closer	together?	When	the	Census	
Bureau	 released	 its	 2009	 American	 Community	 Survey	 (ACS)	 estimates,	 many	 news	 accounts	
focused	on	showing	how	the	numbers	measured	the	impact	of	the	2007‐2009	Great	Recession.	The	
implications	for	families	of	the	economic	and	financial	crises	have	been	the	subject	of	widespread	
speculation,	 ranging	 from	coverage	of	 the	 ‘he‐cession’	of	 job	 loss	 in	 traditionally‐male	dominated	
sectors	of	employment	and	its	consequences	for	marriage	and	divorce,	to	recent	claims	about	the	
increasing	 prevalence	 of	 ‘undivorced’	 couples	 who	 lead	 separate	 lives	 as	 they	 cannot	 afford	 to	
liquidate	 jointly‐held	assets	 that	are	now	worth	pennies	on	the	dollar	(Brines	and	Serafini,	2010;	
Paul,	2010)	
Several	 news	 stories	 –	 including	 those	 in	 the	 New	 York	 Times,	Wall	 Street	 Journal,	 USA	 Today,	
Associated	Press	and	AOL	News	 –	 highlighted	ACS	 findings	 that	 for	 the	 first	 time,	more	25‐to‐34‐
year‐olds	have	never	married	than	are	married.	Among	those	ages	18	and	older,	52%	are	married,	
the	lowest	proportion	in	more	than	a	century.		Young	adults,	according	to	this	narrative,	have	less	
money	to	spend	on	a	wedding	and	are	less	eager	to	enter	into	a	lifetime	commitment	during	times	
of	economic	uncertainty.		
Mather	and	Lavery	(2010)	noted	that	marriage	rates	among	young	people	have	been	dropping	for	
years,	but	the	decline	has	accelerated	since	the	recession	began.	Cohen	(2010)	has	also	picked	up	
on	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 recession	 “…seems	 to	 be	 hurrying	 along	 a	 decline	 in	 marriage”.	 A	 survey	
conducted	 in	 2008	 in	 London	 among	 financial	 analysts,	 stockbrokers	 and	 hedge‐fund	managers	
suggested	 that	 the	 economic	 downturn	 prompted	 an	 upsurge	 in	 divorces	 among	 high‐earners	 in	
London’s	financial	center	(Economist,	2008).	One	explanation	is	that	the	defecting	spouses	of	high	
earners	are	getting	out	before	the	economic	crunch	reduces	the	potential	for	lucrative	settlements.	
Using	county‐level	data	from	the	state	of	Washington,	Brines	and	Serafini	(2010)	showed	that	rising	
unemployment	 led	 to	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 number	 of	 divorce	 filings	 and	 this	 effect	 was	 most	
pronounced	during	the	2008	recession.		
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On	 the	other	hand,	 another	 survey	 result	 from	 the	UK	showed	 that	as	 the	 recession	 took	hold	 in	
2008,	the	number	of	divorces	fell	to	the	lowest	level	since	1975,	suggesting	that	more	couples	may	
be	staying	together	because	the	economic	crisis	left	them	unable	to	afford	to	split	(Cassidy	2010).	
Unlike	 the	 high	 income	 earners,	 the	 link	 between	 divorce	 rates	 and	 economic	 conditions	 is	 less	
clear‐cut	for	the	middle	income	earners,	not	least	since	the	main	marital	asset	is	houses	rather	than	
spouses.	 Rising	 inflation	 and	 falling	 house	 prices	 put	 pressure	 on	 marriages	 and	 might	 thus	
contribute	to	higher	divorce	rates.	Still	the	same	factors	also	make	splitting	up	more	complicated.	
Falling	property	prices	mean	that	selling	the	family	home	may	not	provide	sufficient	funds	for	two	
separate	homes,	especially	now	that	lenders	have	become	much	more	selective	(Economist,	2010).	
Using	 data	 from	 1976‐2009,	 Hellerstein	 and	 Morrill	 (2011)	 found	 that	 a	 one	 percentage	 point	
increase	 in	 the	 unemployment	 rate	 is	 associated	 with	 about	 a	 one	 percent	 decline	 in	 the	
contemporaneous	divorce	rate.	
	
Yet	 some	 have	 sounded	 a	 contrarian	 and	 optimistic	 view.	 	 Stevenson	 and	 Wolfers	 (2007)	 and	
Wolfers	(2010)	have	suggested	that	marriage	and	divorce	rates	have	remained	remarkably	immune	
to	the	ups	and	downs	of	the	business	cycle.	In	2009	there	were	about	2.1	million	marriages	in	the	
United	States.	Although	it	does	represent	a	slight	decline	since	the	Great	Recession	began,	Wolfers	
(2010)	argue	that	it’s	the	same	rate	of	decline	that	existed	during	the	preceding	business	cycles	and	
reflects	a	30‐year	trend.	Other	researchers	have	focused	on	the	response	of	family	arrangements	to	
sudden	or	severe	economic	dislocations	that	may	challenge	norms	of	household	resource	allocation	
or	 otherwise	disrupt	 long‐established	patterns	 of	 behavior	 in	marriage	 (Elder	1974;	Ware	1982;	
Westin	1976).	Still	others	point	to	the	enduring	resilience	of	family	bonds,	and	suggest	that	these	
ties	are	remarkably	adaptive	in	their	ability	to	absorb	social,	economic,	and	cultural	“shocks.”	These	
authors	maintain	that	the	fragility	of	marriage	in	recent	years	is	vastly	overstated.	
So	 which	 view	 is	 correct?	 Will	 the	 recession	 strengthen	 or	 weaken	 marriage?	 Two	 conflicting	
explanations	of	this	relationship	have	been	given	in	the	literature	(South,	1985).	On	the	one	hand,	
economic	booms	make	divorce	more	affordable,	providing	unhappy	couples	the	financial	means	to	
end	their	marriages.	So	demand	for	divorce	would	increase	as	income	increases	thus	leading	to	the	
widely	held	belief	that	the	number	of	divorces	increases	during	economic	expansions	and	decreases	
during	 recessions.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 deteriorating	 economic	 conditions,	 due	 to	 say	 high	
unemployment,	 place	 strains	 on	marital	 relationship	 and	 lead	 to	more	 divorce	 (Liker	 and	 Elder,	
1983).	According	to	this	view,	divorce	would	increase	during	economic	downturns.	
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This	paper	will	 analyze	 the	 impact	 of	 business	 cycle	 fluctuations	on	marriage	 and	divorce	 in	 the	
United	States	using	state‐level	data.	In	particular,	it	will	provide	evidence	on	the	impact	of	the	Great	
Recession	of	2007‐9	on	marital	status.	Determining	how	macroeconomic	conditions	affect	divorce	
rates	is	an	important	component	in	understanding	the	stability	of	marriages.	 	Another	motivation	
for	this	study	is	that	the	results	would		suggest	important	avenues	for	future	research	on	the	
determinants	 of	 divorce	 at	 the	 individual‐level.	 For	 example,	 researchers	 and	policymakers	 have	
long	 sought	 to	 identify	 factors	 that	 contribute	 to	 marital	 instability,	 particularly	 in	 at‐risk	
populations.	 Identifying	 how	 macroeconomic	 conditions,	 affect	 families	 will	 contribute	 to	 our	
understanding	of	how	families	may	or	may	not	cope	with	business	cycles.	
	
The	 rest	 of	 the	 paper	 is	 organized	 as	 follows.	 Section	 II	 reviews	 the	 literature	 while	 Section	 III	
discusses	 the	 trend	 in	 marriage	 and	 divorce	 in	 the	 United	 States.	 Section	 IV	 presents	 the	
methodology	while	 Section	 V	 discusses	 the	 data	 source	 and	 estimation	 results.	 	 The	 paper	 ends	
with	a	summary	and	conclusions	in	Section	VI.	
	
II. Literature	Review	
	
Although	economic	uncertainty	has	been	 linked	 to	marital	disruption	by	 several	 recent	empirical	
studies,	 there	 is	 a	 lack	 of	 consensus	 regarding	 how	 economic	 downturns	 might	 impact	 family	
behavior.	 Most	 mechanisms	 linking	 economic	 context	 to	 family	 behavior	 support	 one	 of	 two	
arguments,	 one	 centered	 on	 relational	 stress	 and	 the	 other	 on	 relative	 costs	 (Brines	 and	 Serafini	
2010;	 Fischer	 and	 Liefbroer	 2006).	 Under	 the	 relational	 stress	 approach,	 family	 life	 is	 disrupted	
during	 economic	 downturns,	 especially	 for	 low‐income	 families,	 because	 spouses	 are	 under	
pressure	to	keep	their	families	and	lifestyles	afloat.	Conflicts	arise	when	partners,	especially	men,	
are	chronically	unemployed	or	have	insufficient	earnings	(Cherlin	1992;	Brines	and	Serafini	2010).	
In	 addition,	 during	periods	of	 economic	 contraction,	partners	may	 avoid	 costly	 joint	 investments	
such	 as	 housing	 because	 they	 lack	 the	 financial	 resources	 or	 because	 the	 uncertainty	 of	 the	
environment	deters	large	investments	of	this	type.	This	has	consequences	for	marriage	and	divorce	
because	 these	 investments	 strengthen	 interdependence	 and	build	 cohesiveness	 in	 couples;	when	
they	 are	 foregone,	 spouses	 miss	 an	 opportunity	 to	 solidify	 their	 ties	 to	 each	 other	 (Brines	 and	
Joyner	1999).		
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The	relative	costs	argument,	on	the	other	hand,	implies	that	marriage	break‐up	should	be	less	likely	
during	 periods	 of	 economic	 recession.	 Divorce	 may	 be	 especially	 costly	 during	 this	 period	 as	 it	
involves	 the	 loss	 of	 marital	 surplus	 realized	 through	 economies	 of	 scale	 and	 household	
specialization	that	may	help	people	maintain	their	standard	of	 living	or	even	survive	in	the	event	
that	one	or	both	spouses	 lose	work	or	earned	 income	(Becker,	Landes	and	Michael	1977;	Becker	
1981).	Thus,	the	negative	financial	prospects	that	characterize	recessionary	periods	may	convince	
spouses,	especially	financially‐dependent	spouses,	to	wait	out	their	marriages	(Cherlin	1992;	Peters	
1993).	 During	 the	 Great	 Recession	 of	 2007‐9,	 ,	 the	mainstream	media	 has	 touted	 these	 types	 of	
arguments	 to	 explain	 perceived	 trends	 among	 some	 couples	 who,	 in	 a	 more	 affluent	 or	 stable	
period,	might	otherwise	divorce	(Brines	and	Serafini,	2010).		
	
A	number	of	recent	papers	have	supported	the	relational	stress	perspective;	 that	 is,	relationships	
are	less	durable	during	periods	of	economic	hardship.	For	example,	South	(1985)	analyzed	several	
cohorts	spanning	1949	to	1979	and	found	that	during	periods	of	high	unemployment	the	divorce	
rate	increased,	whereas	during	periods	of	economic	growth,	the	divorce	rate	decreased.	He	argued	
that	 throughout	 the	 postwar	period,	 the	 financial	 and	 social	 costs	 of	 divorce	 decreased,	 and	 this	
secular	 trend	 held	 through	 recessionary	 periods.	 As	 a	 result,	 spouses	 dissatisfied	 with	 their	
marriages	 faced	 a	 more	 liberal	 legal	 environment,	 less	 social	 stigma,	 higher	 average	 incomes	
relative	to	pre‐war	decades,	and	a	growing	female	labor	force	that	was	less	dependent	on	marriage	
for	economic	support	(South	1985,	pp.	38‐39).	More	recent	research	has	linked	other	macro‐level	
indicators	 of	 economic	 uncertainty	 to	 marital	 instability,	 such	 as,	 men’s	 declining	 labor	 market	
opportunities	 (Ruggles	 1997),	 rising	 inflation	 (Nunley	 2009),	 and	 eroding	 consumer	 confidence	
(Fischer	and	Liefbroer	2006).	Using	data	from	the	Netherlands,	Fischer	and	Liefbroer	(2006)	show	
a	 negative	 relationship	 between	 consumer	 confidence	 and	 marital	 dissolution	 rates	 suggesting	
again	that	divorce	is	counter‐cyclical.	
	
On	 the	 other	 hand,	Weiss	 and	Willis	 (1997)	 suggest	 that	 divorce	 probabilities	 are	 influenced	 by		
unexpected	changes	in	income.	Using	data	from	the	National	Longitudinal	Study	of	the	High	School	
Class	of	1972,	they	show	that	an	increase	in	the	husband’s	earnings	is	stabilizing	to	marriage	while	
a	rise	in	the	wife’s	earnings	is	destabilizing.	Charles	and	Stephens	(2004)	use	a	similar	framework	
and,	 using	 the	 Panel	 Study	 of	 Income	 Dynamics,	 report	 that	 divorce	 rates	 rise	 in	 response	 to	 a	
husband	being	laid	off	 from	a	 job,	but	not	as	a	result	of	 job	loss	due	to	disability	or	plant	closing.	
They	 conclude	 that	 while	 a	 lay‐off	 provides	 information	 to	 the	 wife	 about	 her	 husband’s	 future	
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earnings	 potential,	 job	 loss	 due	 to	 a	 plant	 closing	 does	 not	 change	 the	 wife’s	 information	 set.	
Further,	they	argue	that	there	is	a	stigma	to	leaving	a	disabled	spouse,	so	the	(social)	cost	of	divorce	
in	this	case	is	prohibitively	high.	In	contrast,	using	the	Survey	of	Income	Program	and	Participation,	
Singleton	(2009)	finds	that	disability	of	a	husband	increases	the	probability	of	divorce,	particularly	
in	the	case	of	young	men.	
	
Hellerstein	and	Morrill	 (2011)	provide	empirical	evidence	that	 the	divorce	rate	 is	pro‐cyclical,	at	
least	 in	 recent	 decades.	 Using	 state‐level	 data	 from	 1976‐1998,	 their	 estimate	 show	 that	 	 a	 one	
percentage	 point	 increase	 in	 the	 unemployment	 rate	 over	 the	 sample	 period	 is	 associated	with	
about	a	one	percent	decline	in	the	contemporaneous	divorce	rate.	Their	result	that	divorce	is	pro‐
cyclical	 is	 robust	 to	 various	 alternative	 specifications.	 Amato	 and	 Beattie	 (2011)	 analyzed	 data	
from	50	states	and	 the	District	of	Columbia	 from	1960	to	2005	to	study	how	the	unemployment	
rate	and	the	divorce	rate	are	related.	They	found	unemployment	to	be	positively	related	to	divorce	
in	a	bivariate	analysis,	but	 the	association	 is	not	significant	when	state	and	year	 fixed	effects	are	
included	in	the	statistical	model.	When	the	sample	is	divided	into	time	periods,	unemployment	is	
negatively	 and	 significantly	 associated	 with	 divorce	 after	 1980.	 These	 findings	 provide	 the	
strongest	support	for	a	“cost	of	divorce”	perspective	and	suggest	that	a	high	rate	of	unemployment	
decreases	 the	 rate	 of	 divorce,	 net	 of	 unobserved	 time‐invariant	 state	 characteristics	 and	 period	
(year)	trends.	
	
Thus,	we	know	little	so	far	about	how	changes	in	the	economy	have	affected	families	during	the	first	
decade	of	 the	21st	century	(Brines	and	Serafini	2010).	Changes	 in	 the	structure	of	 labor	markets	
and	the	rise	of	new	forms	of	contingent	or	nonstandard	employment	may	have	acclimated	today’s	
husbands	 and	 wives,	 especially	 young	 married	 people,	 to	 the	 idea	 that	 work	 is	 precarious	 (see	
Kalleberg	2009).	Unemployment	may	be	less	disruptive	for	marriages	today	because	it	might	mean	
something	 different	 than	 it	 did	 just	 two	 decades	 ago.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 concurrent	 rise	 in	
homeownership	 and	 in	 beliefs	 about	 the	 centrality	 of	 investing	 to	 build	 wealth	 or	 ensure	 a	
prosperous	future	in	an	era	of	 flat	wages	may	have	introduced	a	new	factor	 in	calculations	of	the	
costs	of	divorce.		
	
Relative	income,	as	a	measure	of	uncertainty	and	instability,	has	been	linked	to	marital	disruption.	
Most	studies	have	examined	the	role	of	women’s	contribution	to	household	income	as	a	predictor	of	
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divorce	and	have	found	mixed	results	(see	White	and	Rogers	2000).	For	the	past	several	decades,	
the	risk	of	divorce	is	substantially	higher	for	lower‐income	families	relative	to	their	higher	earning	
counterparts,	especially	during	 the	early	years	of	marriage	(Cherlin	1992;	Preston	and	McDonald	
1979;	 but	 see	 Mott	 and	 Moore	 1979).	 Indeed,	 several	 studies	 examining	 the	 effects	 of	 macro‐
economic	factors	on	divorce	rates	at	the	county	or	district	level	have	found	a	similar	pattern;	higher	
median	 incomes	 are	 negatively	 associated	 with	 the	 incidence	 of	 divorce	 (Breault	 and	 Kposowa	
1987).	 However,	 men’s	 declining	 labor	 market	 position	 should	 be	 particularly	 destabilizing	 for	
marriages,	 particularly	 because	 men	 are	 still	 more	 likely	 to	 occupy	 the	 breadwinner	 role,	 an	
argument	 that	has	been	supported	elsewhere	(Ruggles	1997).	This	argument	may	be	particularly	
important	 in	 the	Great	Recession	period	 insofar	 as	men	are	more	 adversely	 impacted	 relative	 to	
women.		
	
III. Trends	in	Marriage	and	Divorce	
Fewer	couples	get	divorced	in	times	of	economic	difficulty,	but	is	that	because	their	marriages	are	
great,	or	because	they're	too	broke	to	get	divorced?		“The	Survey	of	Marital	Generosity”	conducted	
by	the	National	Marriage	Project	at	the	University	of	Virginia	in	2011,	seems	to	suggest	that	both	
things	may	occur	in	times	of	national	hardship.	Despite	previous	findings	that	financial	stress	tends	
to	 weaken	 marriages,	 the	 survey	 from	 a	 nationally	 representative	 sample	 of	 1,197	 married	
Americans	 aged	18	 to	 45,	 found	 that	 29	percent	 of	Americans	 believe	 the	most	 recent	 recession	
deepened	 their	 commitment	 to	 marriage.	 What's	 more,	 38	 percent	 of	 couples	 who	 had	 been	
considering	divorce	prior	to	the	recession	put	those	plans	aside.	
This	survey	suggests	that	while	there	are	certainly	cases	of	couples	delaying	marriage	as	the	result	
of	 a	 job	 loss	 due	 to	 the	 Great	 Recession,	 is	 not	 likely	 the	 primary	 cause	 for	 the	 decline	 in	 the	
percentage	of	married	persons	between	2008	and	2009.The	proportion	of	people	15	years	and	over	
who	are	married	is	on	the	decline	in	the	United	States	and	has	been	for	decades,	during	both	times	
of	 economic	 growth	 and	 recessions	 (see	 Figures	 1‐3	 for	 the	 trend	 in	 divorce	 rate	 both	 at	 the	
aggregate	and	disaggregated	level).	There	are	several	 factors	at	work	contributing	to	this	decline.	
As	the	percentage	of	married	persons	has	declined	from	67	percent	in	1950	to	54	percent	in	2009,	
the	percentage	of	divorced	persons	has	risen.	 In2009,	more	 than	23	million	or	9.7	percent	of	 the	
population	 was	 divorced	 compared	 to	 just	 2.2	 percent	 in	 1950.	 Last	 year	 30	 percent	 of	 the	
population	15	years	and	over	had	never	been	married	compared	to	23	percent	in	1950.	Both	men	
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and	women	are	delaying	marriage.	In	1970,	the	median	age	for	first	marriage	was	23	years	for	men	
and	21	 for	women.	Last	year	median	age	for	 first	marriage	had	risen	to	28	years	 for	men	and	26	
years	 for	women.	As	 these	trends	suggest,	 the	percentage	of	 the	population	married	would	 likely	
have	declined	between	2008	and	2009	even	if	the	economy	had	been	booming.	Between	2005	and	
2006	during	 the	height	 of	 the	 last	 expansion,	 the	percentage	of	 the	population	 that	was	married	
declined	by	0.4	percent.	The	percentage	of	the	population	that	is	married	has	declined	or	remained	
unchanged	in12	out	of	the	past	15	fifteen	years.	
In	the	decade	and	a	half	that	followed	the	passing	of	the	no‐fault	divorce	bill	in	California	in	1969,	
virtually	every	state	in	the	Union	followed	California's	lead	and	enacted	a	no‐fault	divorce	law	of	its	
own.	This	legal	transformation	was	only	one	of	the	more	visible	signs	of	the	divorce	revolution	then	
sweeping	the	United	States:	From	1960	to	1980,	 the	divorce	rate	more	than	doubled	—	from	9.2	
divorces	per	1,000	married	women	to	22.6	divorces	per	1,000	married	women.	In	the	years	since	
1980,	however,	these	trends	have	not	continued	on	straight	upward	paths,	and	the	story	of	divorce	
has	 grown	 increasingly	 complicated.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 divorce,	 as	 in	 so	 many	 others,	 the	 worst	
consequences	of	the	social	revolution	of	the	1960s	and	'70s	are	now	felt	disproportionately	by	the	
poor	and	less	educated,	while	the	wealthy	elites	who	set	off	these	transformations	in	the	first	place	
have	 managed	 to	 reclaim	 somewhat	 healthier	 and	 more	 stable	 habits	 of	 married	 life.	 This	
imbalance	 leaves	 our	 cultural	 and	 political	 elites	 less	 well	 attuned	 to	 the	 magnitude	 of	 social	
dysfunction	in	much	of	American	society,	and	leaves	the	most	vulnerable	Americans	—	especially	
children	 living	 in	 poor	 and	 working‐class	 communities	 —	 even	 worse	 off	 than	 they	 would	
otherwise	be.	
After	rising	from	16.4	per	1000	married	women	in	2005	to	17.5	per	1000	married	women	in	2007,	
divorce	rates	in	the	US	fell		to	16.9	per	1000	married	women	in	2008.	This	divorce	decline	suggests	
that	 most	 married	 couples	 have	 not	 responded	 to	 the	 economic	 crisis	 following	 the	 2007‐9	
recession	by	divorcing.	Instead,	judging	by	divorce	trends,	many	couple	appear	to	be	developing	a	
new	appreciation	for	the	economic	and	social	support	that	marriage	can	provide	in	tough	times.	
	
IV. Methodology	
In	 this	paper	we	consider	a	general	hypothesis	 regarding	 the	 impact	of	permanent	 income	 levels	
and	business	 cycle	 fluctuations	on	divorce	 rate	 at	 the	 state	 level.	 To	do	 so,	we	 follow	Melitz	 and	
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Zumer	(2002)	and	use	the	regression	model	that	they	used	to	examine	the	regional	distribution	and	
stabilization	 through	 the	central	government	budget.	Gokcekus	and	Suzuki	 (2011)	used	 the	same	
model	to	analyze	the	impact	of	business	cycle	on	corruption.	
	
Consider	the	following	equation:	
	
DIVORCEi,t	=	β0		+		β1INCOMEi	+	β2(INCOMEi,t	–	INCOMEi)		+	εi,t	 	 (1)	
	
Where	 DIVORCEi,t,	 defined	 as	 DIVORCEi,t/	 DIVORCEAVE,t,	 stands	 for	 the	 relative	 level	 of	 divorce;	
INCOMEi,t	is	GDPi,t/GDPAVE,t,	and	GDP	is	per	capita	gross	state	product;	and	εi,t	is	a	disturbance	term.	
Subscripts	 i	and	t	 	refer	 to	state	(i=1,2,…M)	and	year	(t=1,2,…T),	and	AVE	 is	 the	average	over	the	
sample	 state.	 The	 average	 of	 INCOMEi,t	 over	 the	 entire	 period,	 INCOMEi	 reflects	 the	 level	 of	
permanent	 income	 in	 state	 i	 relative	 to	 other	 states	 in	 the	 sample.	 The	 deviation,	 (INCOMEi,t	 –	
INCOMEi),	reflects	transitory	income.		
	
Gokcekus	 and	 Suzuki	 (2011)	 have	 shown	 that	 coefficient	 β1	 can	 exist	 even	 when	 there	 is	 no	
movement	in	the	time	series,	whereas	coefficient	β2	depends	entirely	on	such	movement.	This	can	
be	shown	by	decomposing	Equation	(1)	into	two	components:	
	
DIVORCEi,t	=		β0		+		β1INCOMEi	+	ηi	 	 	 	 	 	 (2)	
	
DIVORCEi,t	‐	DIVORCEi	=		β2(INCOMEi,t	–	INCOMEi)		+		µi,t	 	 	 (3)	
	
Where	ηi	and	µi,t	are	two	disturbance	terms.	As	ηi	and	µi,t	adds	up	to		εi,t,	Equations	(2)	and	(3)	add	
up	to	Equation	(1).	
	
The	coefficient	β1	measures	the	response	to	the	level	of	permanent	income	while	the	coefficient	β2	
shows	the	effect	of	contemporary	transitory	deviations	from	the	long	run	average	income	level	on	
divorce	rate	over	the	business	cycle.	In	other	words,	it	shows	the	cyclical	behavior	of	divorce.	
	
Melitz	and	Zumer	(2002)	and	Gokcekus	and	Suzuki	(2011)	argue	that	a	distributed‐lag	version	of	
the	equations	is	more	appropriate	when	there	are	 lagged	impact.	Accordingly,	Equation	(3)	could	
be	re‐formulated	as		
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DIVORCEi,t	‐	DIVORCEi	=		∑Lj=0β2,t‐j(INCOMEi,t‐j	–	INCOMEi)	+	υi,t	 	 (4)	
	
Where	L	is	the	number	of	lags;	∑Lj=0β2,t‐j	is	the	cumulative	sum	of	the	effect	of	transitory	deviations,	
and	υi,t	is	the	disturbance	term.	
	
V. Data Source and Empirical Results 
The	measure	 of	 divorce	 used	 in	 this	 study	 is	 the	 refined	 divorce	 rate,	 defined	 as	 the	 number	 of	
divorces	per	1,000	married	women	age	15	and	older.	South	 (1985)	has	argued	 that	although	 the	
refined	divorce	rate	 is	 insensitive	 to	 the	age	composition	of	 the	married	population,	 the	measure	
compares	favorably	with	age‐specific	divorce	rates	and	is	clearly	preferable	to	two	other	measures,	
the	crude	divorce	rate	and	the	ratio	of	divorces	to	marriages.	
	
Data	on	gross	state	product	are	taken	from	the	Bureau	of	Economic	Analysis.	The	state‐level	annual	
divorce	rate	data	are	from	the	vital	statistics	data	series	prepared	by	the	National	Center		
for	Health	Statistics.	Updates	by	Justin	Wolfers:		
	http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/jwolfers/data/DivorceDataAppendix.pdf	
are	 used	 to	 update	 the	 series	 through	 1998.	 Figures	 for	 1999‐2009	 are	 again	 taken	 from	 the	
National	Center	for	Health	Statistics:	
	http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvss/divorce_rates_90_95_99‐09.pdf	
The	 sample	 period	 runs	 from	 1978	 through	 2009.	 Unfortunately,	 consistent	 divorce	 data	 is	 not	
available	 for	 all	 states	 in	 the	U.S.	 The	 Vital	 Statistics	 are	missing	 data	 for	 a	 number	 of	 years	 for	
California,	 Hawaii,	 Indiana,	 Louisiana	 and	 New	 Mexico.	 These	 five	 states	 are	 therefore	 dropped	
from	the	analysis.		
	
As	pointed	out	by	Hellerstein	 and	Morrill	 (2011),	 this	 sample	period	 reflect	 a	 period	where	 vast	
changes	occurred	in	the	divorce	rate.	As	divorces	became	more	common	in	the	late	1970s	and	early	
1980s,	 cultural	 attitude	 towards	 divorce	 shifted	 and	 it	 carried	 less	 of	 a	 social	 stigma	 (also	 see	
Thornton	and	Young‐DeMarco,	2001).	Moreover,	as	many	states	adopted	the	unilateral	and	no‐fault	
divorce	 legislation,	 it	 became	 easier	 for	 one	 partner	 alone	 to	 initiate	 a	 divorce	 and	 that	 partner	
would	not	have	the	same	burden	of	establishing	fault	for	grounds	of	divorce	(see	Friedberg,	1998).	
Hellerstein	and	Morrill	 (2011)	also	argued	 that	 as	 long	as	one	of	 the	possible	 channels	by	which	
10 
 
macroeconomic	 conditions	 affect	 divorce	 is	 through	 a	 change	 in	 one	 partner’s	 valuation	 of	 the	
quality	 of	 the	marital	 match,	 this	 channel	 will	 be	much	more	 relevant	 in	 a	 situation	where	 one	
partner	can	 initiate	divorce	without	establishing	 fault.	Moreover,	women	were	entering	the	 labor	
force	in	increasing	numbers	thereby	reducing	a	woman’s	financial	risk	in	divorcing.	
	
Equations	(2)‐(4)	are	estimated	separately	using	five	regressions.	Equation	(2)	is	initially	estimated	
using	 OLS	 and	 is	 shown	 in	 Column	 2	 in	 Table	 1.	 The	 coefficient	 β1	 is	 0.566	 and	 is	 statistically	
significant	and	negative.	This	implies	that	permanent	income	significantly	reduces	the	occurrence	
of	 divorce.	 As	 there	 is	 a	 potential	 for	 reciprocal	 influence	 and	 endogeneity,	 the	 methodology	
outlined	 in	 Chowdhury	 (2004)	 is	 used	 to	 estimate	 Equation	 (2)	 using	 Two	 Stage	 Least	 Squares	
(2SLS).	Latitude	is	used	as	an	instrumental	variable	for	per	capita	state	income.	The	results	of	the	
2SLS	is	reported	in	Column	3.	The	coefficient	of	β1	is	again	statistically	significant	and	negative	with	
an	absolute	value	of	0.608.	Thus	 the	 finding	 from	 the	OLS	 that	an	 increase	 in	permanent	 income	
significantly	reduces	the	occurrence	of	divorce	is	also	supported	by	the	2SLS	results.	
	
Next,	we	estimate	the	contemporary	effect	of	transitory	income	on	divorce	as	given	in	Equation	(3).	
The	OLS	results	are	given	in	Column	4	in	Table	1.	The	results	show	a	statistically	significant	positive	
relationship	 between	 divorce	 and	 transitory	 income.	 The	 β2	 coefficient	 is	 positive	 and	 equal	 to	
0.224.	 Equation	 (3)	 is	 also	 estimated	 using	 the	 generalized	 method	 of	 moment	 –	 instrumental	
variable	(GMM‐IV)	technique	(Arellano	and	Bond,	1991;	Chowdhury,	2004).	The	results	are	shown	
in	Column	5.	The	coefficient	β2	is	again	statistically	significant	and	positive.	The	coefficient	estimate	
is	0.189.	These	estimates	indicate	that	divorce	practices	are	more	pervasive	during	business	booms.	
	
Finally,	we	consider	the	possibility	of	lagged	influence.	Equation	(4)	is	estimated	using	GMM‐IV	and	
the	estimation	results	are	reported	in	Column	6.	The	coefficients	β2,t	and	β2,t‐1,	are	0.128	and	0.095,	
respectively.	They	are	both	statistically	significant.	The	total	effect	of	the	transitory	deviations,	the	
cumulative	sum,	∑1j=0β2,t‐j	is	0.223.	The	positive	signs	of	the	coefficients	are	consistent	with	both	the	
OLS	 and	 GMM‐IV	 (without	 lag)	 estimation	 results.	 Taken	 together,	 the	 results	 in	 Table	 1	
consistently	show	that	the	higher	the	transitory	 income,	 the	higher	 is	 the	 incidence	of	divorce.	 In	
other	words,	divorce	is	pro‐cyclical.	We	find	strong	evidence	that	the	divorce	rate	is	pro‐cyclical,	a	
result	that	is	consistent	with	the	two	other	very	recent	studies	examining	the	cyclicality	of	divorce	
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using	vital	statistics	data	(Amato	and	Beattie,	2011;	Schaller,	2010).	These	results	are	also	similar	to	
those	 reported	 in	 Hellerstein	 and	Morrill	 (2011)	 but	 contrary	 to	Wolfers	 (2010).	 Moreover,	 the	
results	of	Equation	(2)	show	that	divorce	rates	are	higher	in	states	with	higher	income.	
	
	
	
VI. Summary	and	Conclusions	
The	 Great	 recession	 of	 2007‐9	 has	 caused	 significant	 amounts	 of	 financial	 stress	 and	 economic	
hardship	for	American	married	couples	and	has	directly	affected	their	personal	lives.		A	secondary	
affect	of	the	recession	has	been	on	divorce	rates	as	the	rates	have	decreased	since	early	spring	of	
2008	with	the	deepening	of	 the	economic	crisis.	That	trend,	however,	has	recently	reversed	 itself	
and	 divorce	 rates	 have	 started	 to	 increase.	 Some	 of	 the	 increase	 may	 be	 attributable	 to	 the	
improved	economy.		Some	of	the	increase,	however,	is	likely	attributable	to	couples	who	previously	
delayed	their	divorces	but	are	no	longer	willing	to	do	so.	
In	 this	paper	we	consider	a	general	hypothesis	 regarding	 the	 impact	of	permanent	 income	 levels	
and	 business	 cycle	 fluctuations	 on	 divorce	 rate	 at	 the	 state	 level	 in	 the	 United	 States.	 Using	 the	
regression	model	developed	in	Melitz	and	Zumer	(2002),	and	data	for	45	states	over	the	1978‐2009	
sample	 period,	 the	 paper	 shows	 that	 the	 higher	 the	 level	 of	 transitory	 income,	 the	 higher	 is	 the	
incidence	of	divorce.	In	other	words,	divorce	is	pro‐cyclical.	
Why	do	divorce	decrease	during	 recession	and	 increase	during	expansion?	As	divorce	eliminates	
the	gains	from	marriage	such	as	household	division	of	labor	(Becker,	1991)	and	the	cost	sharing	of	
public	goods	(Lam,	1988),	 it	 is	costly	to	the	couple.	So	when	an	economy	is	 in	crisis	and	people’s	
incomes	are	low,	the	cost	of	divorce	will	prevent	a	couple	from	divorcing	irrespective	of	the	quality	
of	 their	 marriage.	 In	 this	 case,	 divorce	 is	 not	 an	 effective	 option	 for	 a	 couple.	 Extending	 this	
reasoning	to	the	Great	Recession	of	2007‐9,	it	can	be	argued	that	scarce	employment	opportunities	
and	 reductions	 in	 the	 value	 of	 martial	 assets	 had	 forced	 couples	 to	 remain	 together,	
notwithstanding	marital	difficulties.		Unemployment	rates	have	stubbornly	remained	close	to	10%,	
and	the	percentage	of	people	working	with	reduced	hours	or	pay	is	far	in	excess	of	that	number.		
Complicating	matters	is	that	divorces	are	often	instigated	by	financial	problems.		In	many	divorces	
one	or	both	of	the	spouses	involved	have	either	lost	a	job,	have	their	job	in	jeopardy,	or	had	their	
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hours	or	pay	reduced.	Consequently,	many	estranged	spouses	are	in	a	financial	bind,	when	it	comes	
to	their	divorce,	giving	a	whole	new	meaning	to	the	promise	“for	richer	or	poorer.”		Many	couples	
simply	do	not	have	enough	money	necessary	 to	 support	 themselves	 separately	 and	pay	 for	 their	
other	financial	obligations	As	a	result,	many	couples	that	wanted	to	separate	and	divorce	had	either	
put	their	cases	on	hold	and	remained	together	out	of	economic	necessity	or	were	looking	for	more	
creative	and	cost	efficient	means	by	which	to	separate	and	divorce.	
A	second	major	reason	that	divorces	are	being	delayed	is	directly	related	to	the	depressed	housing	
market	as	the	marital	assets	are	worth	significantly	less	today	than	they	were	just	a	few	years	ago.	
In	the	past,	divorcing	couples	often	used	equity	that	they	built	up	in	their	marital	residence	to	fund	
their	divorce	and	provide	each	of	them	with	a	nest	egg	to	begin	their	separate	lives.		Home	prices	in	
the	last	few	years	have	dropped	significantly,	however,	wiping	out	much	or	all	of	the	equity.		Worse	
yet,	 in	 many	 situations,	 couples	 need	 to	 attempt	 a	 short	 sale	 to	 separate	 financially.	 Anecdotal	
evidences	suggest	that	in	certain	cases,	moving	divorces	forward	has	become	more	difficult	because	
couples	do	not	have	the	financial	means	to	support	themselves	separately.	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 economic	 downturn	 forced	many	 couples	 to	 redouble	 efforts	 to	 save	 their	
marriages.	 Despite	 increased	 marital	 stress	 due	 to	 the	 economy,	 the	 divorce	 rate	 has	 actually	
declined	 since	 the	 financial	 collapse—one	 of	 many	 trends	 supposedly	 caused	 by	 the	 recession.	
Why?	Perhaps	it’s	just	too	expensive	to	split	up	now.		
Or	 perhaps	 there	 is	 a	 psychological	 reason	 behind	 the	 drop	 in	 divorce	 during	 recessions.	When	
surrounded	by	stories	of	job	loss	and	foreclosure,	couples	come	to	realize	what’s	truly	important	in	
life,	 and	 their	new	priorities	 include	serious	efforts	 to	make	marriages	work.	 In	other	words,	 the	
shift	 in	 the	 broader	 economic	 climate	 have	 led	many	Americans	 to	 deepen	 their	 commitment	 to	
marriage	and,	in	some	cases,	to	cancel	their	plans	to	divorce.	
But	when	a	couple	decides	to	postpone	divorce	due	to	a	recession,	 it	does	not	usually	mean	their	
desire	 ultimately	 to	 split	 is	 reduced.	 In	 fact	 studies	 have	 shown	 that	 couples	 that	 experienced	
unemployment	 and	 the	 resulting	 financial	 crisis	 are	more	 likely	 to	 experience	 split	 up	down	 the	
road.	So,	for	some	couples,	recessions	actually	stoke	demand	for	divorce,	even	as	they	make	it	more	
difficult	to	achieve.		
Now	that	sentiment	has	changed	after	the	recession	ended.	As	the	economy	moved	into	a	slow	and	
moderate	recovery	beginning	in	mid‐2009,	this	pent‐up	demand	for	divorce	was	released	and	the	
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rates	 increased.	 That,	 in	 large	 part,	 is	 why	 divorce	 generally	 follow	 a	 ‘pro‐cyclical’	 course,	
fluctuating	in	sympathy	with	the	economy.		
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Table	1:	Regression	results:	divorce	as	a	function	of	permanent	and	transitory	incomes	
	
	 	 	 	 										Equation	(2)		 	 									Equation	(3)___	 	 Eq.	(4)	
Column	1	 	 	 2	 	 3	 	 4	 	 5	 	 6____	
Independent	 	 	 OLS	 	 IV	 	 OLS	 	 GMM	 	 GMM	
Variable	(coefficient)	 	 	 	 (2SLS)	 	 	 	 IV	 	 IV	
	
Constant	(β0)	 	 	 0.391	 	 0.644	
	 	 	 	 (0.063)		 (0.000)	
	
Permanent		(β1)	 	 ‐0.566	 	 ‐0.608	
Income		 	 	 (0.013)		 (0.044)	
Transitory	(β2)		 	 	 	 	 	 0.224	 	 0.189	 	 0.165	
Income		 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.023)		 (0.007)	
	
Transitory	(β2,t)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.128	
Income		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.001)	
	
Transitory	(β2,t‐1)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.095	
Income		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (0.002)	
	
	
No.	of	observations	 	 45	 	 45	 	 1350	 	 1350	 	 1350	
	
Adjusted	R2	 	 	 0.70	 	 0.68	 	 0.18	
	
Degrees	of	Freedom	 	 43	 	 43	 	 1349	 	 82	 	 164	
	
	
	
P‐values	are	in	parentheses.	
OLS	refers	to	ordinary	least	squares;	and	GMM‐IV	to	Arellano	Bond	Bover	GMM‐IV	estimation	
Β2	in	column	(5)	refers	to	∑1j=0β2,t‐j	in	Equation	(4).	
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Figure	1:	Number	of	Divorces	per	1,000	Married	Women	Age	15	and	Older,	by	Year,		
United	States	
 
 
 
 
Source:	The	State	of	Our	Unions	2009,	Figure	5.	
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Figure2:	Percentage	of	All	Persons	Age	15	and	Older	Who	Were	Divorced,	By	Sex	and	
Race,	1960‐2010	
 
 
 
Source:	The	State	of	Our	Unions	2009,	Figure	6.
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Figure	3:	Historical	Divorce	Rate	in	the	United	States,	1900‐2009	
 
 
 
Source	‐	Wolfers:	Divorce	and	the	Business	Cycle,	2009	
